The continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) is a promising candidate for the immunity to side-channel attacks, but unfortunately seems to face the limitation of transmission distance in contrast to discrete-variable (DV) counterpart. In this paper, we suggest a method of improving the performance of CV-MDI-QKD involving the achievable secret key rate and transmission distance by using zero-photon catalysis (ZPC), which is indeed a noiseless attenuation process. The numerical stimulation results show that the transmission distance of ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD under the extreme asymmetric case is better than that of the original protocol. Attractively, in contrast to the previous single-photon subtraction (SPS)-based CV-MDI-QKD, the proposed scheme enables a higher secret key rate and a longer transmission distance. In particular, the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD can tolerate more imperfections of detectors than both the original protocol and the SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] [2] [3] [4] is one of the most mature domains of quantum information processing, aiming to establish a shared key between two distance honest parties (Alice and Bob) over an insecure channel controlled by an eavesdropper (Eve), and its security can be ensured by quantum mechanics. A review of the latest developments in quantum cryptography can be found in [5] . In particular, the first theoretical Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [6] was proposed, so that the discrete-variable (DV) QKD [6] [7] [8] has received increasing attention, and are even available on the commerce. It can perform outstandingly with respect to the transmission distance, but may suffer from the restriction of lower secret key rates due to the dependence of the single-photon generation and detection.
In order to overcome this shortcoming, the continuousvariable (CV) QKD [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] has emerged as a new solution to promise higher secret key rates with the help of the homodyne or heterodyne detection rather than photon counters, which make it more attractive from a practical viewpoint. Especially, the coherent-state Gaussian modulated CVQKD [9] has been rigorously proved to be secure against arbitrary collective attacks [14] , which are optimal in the asymptotical limit [15] . Moreover, it has an advantage of compatibility with traditional telecommunication technologies, and thus shows the potential to be used for the next-generation quantum communication networks [16] . Unfortunately, when considering the imperfection of the detector from a realistic scenario, it opens the door to potential security loopholes that could be successfully exploited by Eve to execute attack strategies, such as the local oscillator calibration attack [17] , the wavelength attack [18] , and the detector saturation attack [19] . To resist these attacks, there are usually two solutions, i.e., the device-independent QKD [20, 21] and the measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . Different from the former that based on the violation of a Bell inequality [20] , the latter is a more practical way to prevent all side-channel attacks on detection where the security of the protocol does not rely on the reliability of the measurement devices. Even so, when comparing with that of DV-MDI-QKD [28, 29] , the maximal transmission distance of CV-MDI-QKD is still unsatisfactory. Thus, how to effectively improve the maximal transmission distance in CV-MDI-QKD is an interesting and challenging task.
Till now, many efforts have been devoted to improving its performance in CV-MDI-QKD systems. In general, the use of discrete modulations [30] or quantum operations [31] [32] [33] is a viable means. For instance, a discrete-modulated CV-MDI-QKD protocol has been proposed recently, which outperforms the Gaussianmodulated CV-MDI-QKD protocol with respect to the achievable maximal transmission distance since such a discrete modulation has efficient reconciliation error correction codes in the regime of low signal-to-noise ratio [30] . However, it has a problem that the modulation variance should be sufficient low in order to derive the Eve's Holevo information, which may cause the transmitting power of the quantum signal to be too low and hence has much effect on the performance of QKD. In addition, a novel CV-MDI-QKD protocol using optical amplifiers has shown that it can achieve a higher secret key rate and a longer transmission distance, compared with previous coherent-and squeezed-states protocols [31] . Recently, the photon-subtraction operation [34, 35] , which can be emulated by non-Gaussian postselection [36] , has been proved to lengthen the maximal transmission distance of CV-MDI-QKD [32, 33] . More interesting, the single-photon subtraction (SPS) presents the best performance. In spite of the photon subtraction showing its unique advantages, however, there are still restricted to the low success probability of implementing such an operation for a given certain variance of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) state, thereby resulting in the loss of information between Alice and Bob during the distillation of secret keys. Fortunately, the quantum catalysis operation [37] , which can be implemented with existing technologies, may become an alternative method of improving the performance of CVQKD systems in terms of secret key rate and transmission distance, especially in the case of zero-photon catalysis (ZPC) [38, 39] . Currently, the characteristics of quantum catalysis have been widely utilized in quantum coherence [40] , nonclassicality [41] , entanglement property [42, 43] , and so on. As far as we know, there is few applications of quantum catalysis in CV-MDI-QKD. Inspired by the aforementioned analysis, in this paper, we suggest a method to improve the performance of coherent-state CV-MDI-QKD by using the ZPC, which has the characteristics of noiseless attenuation and can keep the Gaussian behavior of Wigner function. The proposed ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD can lengthen the maximal transmission distance with the achievable high secret key rate. It performs better than the SPS case with respect to both secret key rate and transmission distance. This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we describes the characteristics of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol involving the ZPC operation. In Sec.III, we show the performance of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD system. The secret key rate of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD is first derived according to the optimality of Gaussian attack. After that, the simulations and performance analysis results are provided. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sec.IV.
II. THE ZPC-BASED CV-MDI-QKD PROTOCOL
In order to improve the performance of the CVQKD system, we elaborate the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD protocol with Gaussian-modulated coherent states in Fig. 1 . Among them, Fig. 1(a) shows the prepare-and-measure (PM) scheme of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD protocol. It is easy to implement the PM scheme in practice, but not conducive to security analysis. Consequently, we consider its equivalent entanglement-based (EB) scheme of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD, as depicted in Fig. 1(b) , where Alice and Bob respectively prepare an entanglement resource, i.e., EPR 1 and EPR 2 with variances V A and V B . They retain modes A 1 and B 1 , and send other modes A 2 and B 2 to an untrusted third party Charlie through the quantum channel with length L AC and L BC , respectively. To reduce equipment requirements, we assume that the ZPC operation is controlled by an untrusted party David, who is close to Alice's station. On top of that, Charlie, first interferes with two received modes A 2 and B 2 via a 50:50 beam splitter and obtains two output modes C 1 and C 2 , and then per- forms homodyne detection to obtain a measurement results {X C1 , P C2 }, which are publicly announced through a classical channel. After receiving {X C1 , P C2 }, Bob uses a displacement operation D (β) with β = g (X C1 + iP C2 ) to modify mode B 1 to B 1 , where g is a gain factor. By using heterodyne detection, Alice and Bob respectively measure modes A 1 and B 1 to obtain their own data {X A , P A } and {X B , P B } of which the data can be used for implementing parameter estimations. Finally, a string of secret key can be extracted via data postprocessing.
Due to the assumption that both the EPR 2 state and the displacement operation D (β) are untrusted, the EB scheme of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD can be equivalent to that of the one-way protocol using heterodyne detection [12, 24, 32, 33] , which is illustrated in Fig. 1(c) . It is worth noting that, different from the equivalent oneway protocol, the model of CV-MDI-QKD has two lossy quantum channels. Thus, from the point of view of the attack strategies, Eve can take two attacks, e.g. onemode attack and two-mode attack. However, in a practi- cal system, adopting a two-mode attack is difficult to be achieved thanks to the immaturity of quantum memory technologies. Furthermore, if two lossy quantum channels are independent, then two-mode attack can be reduced to the one-mode attack. As a result, one can take the security analysis under two Markovian memoryless Gaussian channels where no entanglement can be distributed, so that in CV-MDI-QKD, two quantum channels degenerate into the one-mode channel [44] . In this situation, the optimal attack strategy for Eve is regarded as one-mode collective Gaussian attack. Now, let us turn attention to the relationship of channel parameters between the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD and its equivalent one-way protocol. In Fig. 1(b) , since the channels of both Alice-Charlie and Bob-Charlie are both linear, these channels that controlled by Eve can be emulated by using two independent entangling cloner attacks where T A = 10 −κL AC /10 (T B = 10 −κL BC /10 ) and ε A (ε B ) represent the transmittance and excess noise of the channel between Alice (Bob) and Charlie, κ = 0.2 dB/km. In Fig. 1(c) , T c and ε th respectively represent the transmittance and excess noise of the equivalent one-way protocol, i.e., T c = g 2 T A /2, and ε th =
In order to minimize the equivalent excess noise ε th , we take into account g 2 = 2 (V B − 1) / [T B (V B + 1)], and then have excess noise given by
From a practical point of view, we need to consider Charlie's inefficient detections, which can be characterized by a quantum efficiency η and an electronic noise v el . Thus, the detection-added noise can be given by χ hom = (v el + 1 − η) /η, and the total noise referred to the channel input is expressed as χ tot = χ line +2χ hom /T A where χ line = (1 − T c ) /T c + ε th refers to the channeladded noise. Note that all the above noises are in the shot-noise units (SNU).
Before evaluating the performance of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD system, we suggest the physical characteristics of quantum catalysis. As shown in Fig. 2 , the specific structure of ZPC operation (cyan box) is that a vacuum state |0 D in auxiliary mode D is sent to a beam splitter (BS) with a transmittance T = 1 − R, and subsequently an on/off detector only registers zero-photon (no click). Such a catalytic process can, in fact, be taken as an equivalent operatorÔ 0
where B (T ) is the normal ordering form of a BS operator given by exp[(
√ R], and Π of f = |0 D 0| is one of the projection operators in the on/off detector.
After performing by David the ZPC operation for the incoming EPR 1 state in mode A 2 , where EPR 1 on Alice's side can be prepared by applying a two-mode squeezed operator S A1A2 (r) = exp[r(a 1 a 2 − a † 1 a †
2 )] with a squeezing parameter r into the two-mode vacuum state, i.e.,
where λ = (V A − 1) / (V A + 1) with V A = cosh 2r. The resulting state |Φ A1 A2 can be described as
with the normalization factor P d representing the success probability of implementing the ZPC. Based on Eq. (4), the covariance matrix of the state |Φ A1 A2 can be calculated as
where Π represents two-dimensional identity matrix, σ z = diag (1, −1), and x, y, z are given by
As shown in Eq. (2), the ZPC happens to be a noiseless attenuation described asÔ 0 |α → √ T α , where |α is the coherent state in the PM scheme of CV-MDI-QKD.To this end, we plot the Wigner function between the input and output states at a fixed amplitude |α| = 1 as a function of Re (γ) in the phase space γ ∈ (q, p) with several different values of T ∈ {1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7} , as shown in Fig. 2b . We can find that the ZPC not only can effectively maintain the Gaussian behavior of Wigner function, but also does not introduce noises in terms of the Gaussian distribution between |α and √ T α . In addition, unlike the photon-subtraction operation, the ZPC can facilitate the transformation of the target ensemble between modes A 1 and A 2 since the auxiliary vacuum state itself keeps unaffected in mode D. To clearly see this viewpoint, Fig. 3 illustrates the success probabilities of both ZPC (blue surfance) and SPS (magenta surface) with different transmittances T at each λ. We find that the success probability of implementing the ZPC is always better than the SPS case and the gap at a given transmittance T extends with the decrease of λ. This means that the ZPC has the advantage of the success probability over the photon-subtraction case, thereby effectively preventing data loss between Alice and Bob in the process of extracting the secret key. Moreover, after the ZPC, interestingly, the resulting state |Φ A1 A2 in Eq. (4) is still an EPR state with an updated squeezing parameter λ √ T .
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE ZPC-BASED CV-MDI-QKD
So far we have suggested the structure characteristics of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD system. In what follows, we calculate the asymptotic secret key rate under the equivalent one-way CVQKD protocol using heterodyne detection, where Bob performs a reverse reconciliation. We analyze the security through numerical simulations and demonstrate the performance improvement of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD system in terms of secret key rate and transmission distance.
A. Derivation of the secret key rate
It is interesting to note that, after performing the ZPC, the traveling state |Φ A1 A2 is still a Gaussian state, which makes it suitable to directly derive the secret key rate from the conventional Gaussian CVQKD. According to the optimality of Gaussian attack [45] [46] [47] , one can calculate the asymptotic secret key rate K by using the covariance matrix in Eq. (6) . Subsequently, the asymptotic secret key rate of the equivalent one-way ZPC-based CVQKD system for reverse reconciliation against onemode collective Gaussian attack is given by
where P d has been defined in Eq. (5), β is the reversereconciliation efficiency, I (A:B) denotes the Shannon mutual information between Alice and Bob, and χ (B:E) represents the Holevo bound between Bob and Eve. As shown in Fig. 1(c) , when the state |Φ A1 A2 passes through an untrusted quantum channel characterized by T c and ε th , the covariance matrix of the state |Φ A1 B1 can be described as follows
Thus, the Shannon mutual information I (A:B) can be calculated as
In order to obtain the Holevo bound χ (B:E), we assume that Eve perceives the existence of the untrusted party David and purifies the whole system ρ A1 B1ED , so that
with the von Neumann entropy
where S(A 1 B 1 ) is a function of the symplectic eigenvalues λ 1,2 of Γ A1 B1 given by λ 
, which is given by λ 3 = X − Z 2 /(Y + 1).
B. Simulation results and analysis
In the traditional CV-MDI-QKD protocols, the performance of the symmetric case (L AC = L BC ) is worse than that of the asymmetric case (L AC = L BC ) with respect to the maximal transmission distance. In particular, for the extreme asymmetric case L BC = 0, the total transmission distance L AB = L AC +L BC can reach the longest ultimate transmission distance. Based on this circumstance, we consider the performance of CV-MDI-QKD protocol in the extreme asymmetric case involving ZPC and SPS. To compare with the previous work [32] , we set V A = V B = 40, ε A = ε B = 0.002 [13] and β = 0.95. Moreover, taking Charlie's homodyne detection imperfections into account, in the following we consider the ideal detection (η = 1, v el = 0) and the imperfect detection (η = 0.975, v el = 0.002), respectively.
For the optimal transmittance T corresponding to Fig.  4(b) , Fig. 4(a) shows the secret key rate as a function of L AB involving the ideal and imperfect detections where the black dotted line stands for the traditional protocol. We find that the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD protocol (blue dashed line), even in the imperfect detection case, can be superior to the traditional protocol. Namely, the ZPC can be used not only for increasing the secret key rate, but also for lengthening the transmission distance. Compared with the performance of the original protocol, the maximal transmission distance L AB of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD for a given secret key rate 10 −4 bit/pulse can be extended approximately 35.6 km for the ideal detection (2.95 km for the imperfect detection). Even if the transmittance T of BS is optimized, the performance of the proposed protocol is equivalent to that of the original protocol at the short-transmission distance. The reason is that there is no quantum catalytic effect when T = 1 of the BS.
Moreover, the tolerable excess noise is another common criteria for evaluating the performance of CVQKD protocols. In Fig. 5 , we illustrate the maximal tolerable excess noise of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD system as a function of L AB with two cases of the ideal detection and the imperfect detection, when optimized over the transmittance T . The numerical simulation results show that, with the same parameters, the proposed protocol presents better than other cases in terms of the maximal tolerable excess noise. The reason is that the ZPC is indeed regarded as a noiseless attenuation, which has been proved to increase the maximal tolerable excess noise [48] . For instance, if ε ∼ 0.001, the proposed protocol enables to lengthen the transmission distance up to 90 km for the ideal detection (20 km for the imperfect detection) between two remote users, which indicates that the ZPC makes the CV-MDI-QKD protocol more tolerant to excess noise. In order to highlight the advantages of quantum catalysis, we show the performance of the SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD system (thin magenta solid line) with respect to the secret key rate and tolerable excess noise, shown in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 5 . We find that the performance of our protocol with the same parameters surpasses the SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD case. The reason is that the success probability of the ZPC is higher than that of SPS, thereby enabling to avoid the loss of information during the extraction of the secret key rate by Alice and Bob. In addition, the physical mechanism of the ZPC is regarded as a noiseless attenuation, which makes signal states strongly indistinguishable to Eve and thus reduces the amount of information stolen. Despite its appealing merits, the proposed protocol is closer to the PirandolaLaurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound [49] that represents the ultimate limit of repeaterless communication than the SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD.
From the above-mentioned analysis, it shows that not only are channel imperfections the threat to the security of CV-MDI-QKD protocols, but also both detection efficiency η and electronic noise v el can affect the information on the secret key rate. Therefore, from this practical viewpoint, Fig. 6 shows the performance comparisons of the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD, the SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD and the original protocol as a function of η and v el . It is found that under the framework of a metropolitan area the performance of CV-MDI-QKD protocol using the ZPC is superior to the other two cases when both detection efficiency η and electronic noise v el take a definite value. That is to say, our protocol allows lower detection efficiency and higher electronic noise in the case of achieving the same performance.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, under the extreme asymmetric case, we have suggested an approach to performance improvement of the CV-MDI-QKD involving the ZPC that can be seen as a noiseless attenuation. We derive the secret key rate of the the ZPC-based CV-MDI-QKD system in the asymptotic regime. The simulation results show that the performance of our protocol can outperform that of the original protocol in terms of the maximal tolerable excess noise and the achievable transmission distance, which means that exploiting such a ZPC operation can provide guidance in designing long distance CVQKD systems. Furthermore, to highlight the advantages of the ZPC in CV-MDI-QKD, as a comparison, the previous SPS-based CV-MDI-QKD is presented. We find that the proposed protocol is superior to the previous SPS case with respect to the secret key rate, the transmission distance and the tolerable excess noise. In particular, from a practical implementation, adding the ZPC operation makes the CV-MDI-QKD protocol more tolerant of homodyne detection imperfections under the framework of a metropolitan area in contrast to the SPS case. Although both of them cannot overcome the PLOB bound at any transmission distance, this prompts us to find other approaches (e.g., two-way CVQKD [50] ) to break through the bound.
